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ARGUMENT
THE REPC WAS NOT RESCINDED BUT RATHER NOT PERFORMED BY
PLAINTIFFS, AND DEFENDANTS, HAVING SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS' EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE REPC, ARE
ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THEIR FEES AND COSTS.
"*If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded in
accordance with the terms of th[e] contract.'" Panos v. Olsen &
Assoc.

Constr.,

Inc.,

123

P.3d

816, 822

(Utah Ct. App.

(quoting Foster v. Montgomery, 82 P. 3d 191, 194

2005)

(Utah Ct. App.

2003)). In the present controversy, the attorney fee provision of
the contract states: "In the event of litigation . . .

to enforce

this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and
reasonable attorney fees." REPC 1 17, Br. of Appellees, Addendum I.
Unquestionably, by the terms of the contract, Defendants, having
prevailed,1 are "entitled'' to reimbursement.
To try to avert paying fees, Plaintiffs cite a succession of
rescission cases, Pis.' Reply. Br. at 23, including BLT Investment

I

Though the Proposed Lease was the primary focus of Plaintiffs'
lawsuit, Plaintiffs also sued Defendants to enforce the REPC under
a fraud theory, Second Am. Compl. SI5 32-38, R. 467-73, which was
rejected by the trial court and which Plaintiffs do not address on
appeal. Thus, Plaintiffs instituted litigation to enforce the REPC
and Defendants prevailed. Following summary judgment, Plaintiffs
sought to amend their complaint to allege new theories to support
enforcement of the REPC. Again, Defendants were required to defend
against these efforts and prevailed, as the trial court rejected
Plaintiffs' post-judgment attempt to amend, R. 779, Br. of
Appellees, Addendum F. Finally, while Plaintiffs did not bring
their fraud theory before this Court, they continue to advance
theories introduced post-summary judgment to support enforcement of
the REPC, entitling Defendants to their fees before this Court.
Panos, 123 P.3d at 822.
1

Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978), Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2005
UT App 522 (unpublished decision), and Chase v. Scott, 38 P. 3d 1001
(Utah Ct. App. 2001). Those case are not applicable to this case,
however, because the REPC was not rescinded in this case. It was
not performed by Plaintiffs. The closing date passed without tender
and the REPC expired by its terms.
More

analogous

to

the

instant

case

than

the

rescission

authorities are Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), and Lee v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1999),
both of which were decided subsequent to Snow and its annunciation
of the rescission rule.
As

noted

in

Defendants'

initial

brief,

there

are

many

similarities between this case and Carr, including that the buyers
in both cases sent belated letters to the sellers informing them of
a willingness to tender without providing the actual funds and that
the buyers in both instances "never actually obtained the loanfs]
necessary

. . .

to

fulfill

. . .

[their]

contractual

obligation[s] and [to] enable [the]m to make a proper tender of .
. . [their] performance." Carr, 781 P.2d at 1294.
Significantly, given these facts and the paucity of evidence
that

tender would

manner,

this

Court

not have been accepted
concluded

that

"Carr's

if made
duty

in a timely

to tender

was

neither performed nor excused. . . . [and] that he was not entitled

2

to prevail in th[e] action." Id.

at 1295.

As to the issue of

attorney fees, the Court advised:
Smith took an entirely defensive posture. It was not
enforcing any right arising under the agreement or
arising from a breach thereof. On the contrary, its
position at trial was that there was no viable contract
left to enforce. While Smith would surely be entitled to
attorney fees under the more typical provision awarding
fees to the prevailing party, it is not entitled to
attorney fees under the provision at issue.
Id. at 1296 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
While Carr accords with the instant case in many ways, perhaps
the one crucial distinction between the two cases is that the fee
provision now at issue is indisputably "the . . . typical provision
awarding fees to the prevailing party." Id.

Hence, Carr indicates

that Defendants are entitled to their fees.
This conclusion is also bolstered by Lee, 977 P.2d at 551, in
which

the

Court

upheld

an

award

of

attorney

fees

under

circumstances resembling those at hand. The parties in the matter
entered

into a purchase

contract

for a parcel

of property

in

Tremonton. Xd. The contract set a " [s]ettlement [djeadline . . . of
x

April 30 - 97.'" Id. "April 30, 1997 passed, and the sale was not

closed." Ld. at 552. Nevertheless, in June of that year, the buyer
scheduled a closing which the sellers did not attend. JEd. Rather,
the sellers argued that "the

[cjontract had expired," id., and

later obtained summary judgment on the basis "that they had no
obligation under the [c]ontract because the closing did not occur
on or before April 30, 1997." Id.
3

Noting

that

"[t]he

[c]ontract

contain[ed]

an

integration

clause," jLd., and that it could " [ ] not be changed except by written
agreement,"

id.,

the

Court

"determined

[that]

the

[c]ontract

unambiguously required a closing date of April 30, 1997," icl. at
553, and affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the sellers.
(As noted in Defendants' initial brief, at 25, the REPC in this
case also required any alteration of the contract to be in writing.
REPC, 1 14, Br. of Appellees, Addendum I.) The Court then proceeded
to the issue of attorney fees.
Citing an attorney fees provision identical to the one that is
the subject of this litigation, Lee, 977 P.2d at 553, the sellers
"assert[ed] that under the [c]ontract they [we]re entitled to fees
for successfully defending." Xd. This Court "agree[d]." .Id. In
short, the Court granted attorney fees on a "[c]ontract [that] had
expired."

I_cl. at

552. In

the present

case,

Plaintiffs

herein

brought an action on an expired contract, requiring Defendants to
defend.
Neither

Defendants

nor

Plaintiffs

(in

this

case)

sought

rescission, nor did the trial court order rescission.2 In granting
2

In Snow, 586 P.2d at 458, the Utah Supreme Court relied on
authority from the Oregon Supreme Court for the rescission rule.
Though Oregon still adheres to the rule, Bennett v. Bauqh, 329 Or.
282, 286 (1999) it is noteworthy that the Oregon Supreme Court
upheld an award of fees where "[d]efendants raised
affirmative defenses . . . [of] estoppel, undue influence, and
rescission," idL at 285, but where the "judgment[, though rendered
in favor of the defendants,] d[id] not declare that the parties'
contract was rescinded." id. at 286. Distilling the decision, the
4

summary judgment, the court concluded "that the date for settlement
under the REPC passed without full performance by either party," R.
508, January 11, 2006 Order at 3, Br. of Appellees, Addendum C, and
that "[i]t appear[ed] that after Plaintiffs encountered difficulty
obtaining

. . . conventional

financing

abandoned by both parties." Id. This casef
to Carr and Lee than

Snow.

In Snow,

. . . , the REPC was
therefore, is more akin

"the trial

court

ordered

rescission," 586 P.2d at 457, stating that "under the facts of
th[e] case the execution of a mutually acceptable escrow agreement
was essentially made a condition to the preliminary agreement." Id.
at 458.
In contrast to the Snow parties, Plaintiffs and Defendants did
come

to

a

consensus,

on

all

material

issues,

which

they

memorialized in the REPC. However, the purpose of the contract was
not accomplished due to nonperformance by Plaintiffs. As in Lee,
the

settlement

deadline

passed

without

the

submission

of

the

purchase price. 977 P.2d at 551. Additionally, as in Carr, there
was no timely tender of the purchase price, 781 P.2d at 1295-96,
and "[n]o loan was ever approved [for the purchase]," i_d. at 1293,
though obtaining a loan "was a condition precedent." Id.

Oregon Court of Appeals wrote: "[T]he Supreme Court held that
defendants are entitled to attorney fees because, although the
trial court entered judgment for defendants, the judgment did not
expressly order rescission of the parties' contract." Bennett v.
Bauqh, 164 Or. App. 243, 246 (1999) (emphasis added).
5

In short, Plaintiffs attempted to enforce the REPC on the
basis of a fraud theory,
contested

on

appeal.

rejected on summary

Plaintiffs

then

judgment and not

asserted

other

theories

following the judgment, and they now invite this Court to overrule
the trial's court's decision denying their endeavor to amend their
complaint for a third time. Defendants implore the Court to award
Defendants their attorney fees according to the terms of REPC,
where Plaintiffs brought suit based in part on the contract and
sought to enforce the expired REPC.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing

reasons, Defendants respectfully request

that the Court reverse the trial court's decision denying attorney
fees to Defendants, and that the case be remanded with direction to
award Defendants the attorney fees and costs incurred before the
trial court and on appeal.
Dated this ^ji

day of January 2007.
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